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Acronyms
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Acronym Definition 
BNL Brookhaven National Laboratories
CLK Clock
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 
DUT Device Under Test
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array 
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center
IC Integrated Circuit
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IP Intellectual Property
JEDC Joint Electron Devices Council
JEDEC Joint Electron Device Engineering Council
JTAG
Joint Test Action Group (FPGAs use JTAG to provide access 
to their programming debug/emulation functions)
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NEPP NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program
POR Power-On-Reset
REDW Radiation Effects Data Workshop
SEB Single Event Burnout
SEE Single Event Effect
SEFI Single Event Functional Interrupt
SEL Single Event Latch-up
SET Single Event Transient
SEU Single Event Upsets
SEUTF Single Event Upset Test Facility
TAP Test Access Port
TCK JTAG clock signal
TDI Test Data Input
TDO Test Data Output
WSR Windowed Shift Register
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Abstract
• Electronic parts (integrated circuits) have grown 
in complexity such that determining all failure 
modes and risks based on single particle event 
radiation testing is impossible.
• In this presentation, the authors will present 
why this is so and provide some realism on 
what this means to FPGAs.
4
It’s all about understanding actual risks
and not making assumptions.
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Introduction
• Device complexity has increased the challenges related 
to radiation single event effects (SEE) testing.
– Obtaining appropriate test coverage and understanding of 
the response of billion-transistor commercial devices, for 
example, are a concern for every tester.
• This is akin to test vector coverage – have we stimulated 
sufficient nodes (or states) during our SEE test to understand 
risk properly?
• We present three tenets for FPGA SEE testing to 
consider:
– Tenet 1: All SEE test data are “good” data;
– Tenet 2: Not all test sets/methods are appropriate or 
complete; and,
– Tenet 3: Not all interpretation and analysis of SEE data are 
accurate.
• Each of these tenets will be discussed in turn with two 
related technical diatribes included.
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Diatribe 1:
Single Event Functional Interrupts 
(SEFIs) – Definitions
• JEDEC JESD89A* Definition
– “A soft error that causes the component to reset, lock-
up, or otherwise malfunction in a detectable way, but 
does not require power cycling of the device (off and 
back on) to restore operability, unlike single-event 
latch-up (SEL), or result in permanent damage as in 
single event burnout (SEB).”
• An example is an SEU in a control register changing 
operational modes of a device.
• Modern integrated circuits (ICs) are not that 
straightforward (see next chart)
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*Joint Electron Devices Council (JEDEC) -
Measurement and Reporting of Alpha Particle and
Terrestrial Cosmic Ray-Induced Soft Errors in Semiconductor Devices
(note: soft errors are terrestrial version of single event upsets (SEUs))
(also note that JESD57 is developing an updated definition)
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Diatribe 1 – SEFIs?
• Are these SEFIs?
– An SEU in hidden circuitry
• May not change apparent device operation, but is 
observed via changes in power consumption (power 
cycle may be required to recover),
– A single event transient (SET) in a power-on-reset 
(POR) circuit  that power cycles/resets the device 
• Problem clears itself, but there is down time and to-be-
determined operating state after recovery,
– An SEU that latches in a redundant (weak or flawed) 
row/column in a memory array
• May not be recoverable by power reset, or
– An SEU in a security block
• Device may continue working, but user’s ability to 
change modes may be disabled.
• We’d say YES and all of these are potential 
FPGA concerns!
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Diatribe 1: SEFI – The Term
• Originally coined in the mid-1990s by Gary Swift 
(then at Jet Propulsion Laboratories) to 
describe a class of SEUs (or a propagated SET) 
that causes a functional “hiccup” to occur and 
may be “soft” (can be cleared be 
reprogramming, restarting, or other non-power 
cycling means) or “hard” (requires power 
cycle). 
– Operational changes would be included as well as 
those “non-operational” changes like current creep.
– This is a more general description than the JEDEC 
definition.
8
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A SEFI Example (1)
• The figure below illustrates a step load increase 
in the power consumption (supply current) that 
occurred during an SEU test on an ancient FPGA 
device (Katz, et al).
– Single event latchup (SEL) is often assumed when 
power increased as observed.
– Device configuration also was altered during the event.
9
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A SEFI Example (2)
• The SEFI event was associated with the built-in 
circuit for the International Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Joint Test Action 
Group (JTAG) 1149.1 Test Access Port (TAP) 
controller as illustrated below.
10
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A SEFI Example (3)
• The bottom line is that the observational line 
between a SEFI and SEL can be very blurry.
• Without a true understanding of the device’s 
operation (for both areas accessible to the user 
and those that aren’t) as well as a maximization 
of visibility by the test set/method, 
understanding and classifying an event may be 
problematic.
11
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Tenet 1: The Data are Always “Good”
• In short, data are just data.
– It is what was observed and captured during an SEE test.
– Now the question becomes: are the data captured 
complete, appropriate, and interpreted correctly?
• Think of the questions this brings into play:
– Have all data points been captured? (adequate and 
reliable data capture),
– Was the test prognostic enough to gather the right range 
of data (think of the simple SET capture from an 
operational amplifier – was the minimum pulse 
width/amplitude sensitivity of your oscilloscope set 
appropriately)? (appropriate test set granularity); or,
– Have all the right test vehicles/designs been used to 
generate that data? (adequate test circuits/operation)
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The point is simple: the data are correct, but there’s either not enough of it or 
insufficient granularity of information.
The simple takeaway is that testing requires a look far below the surface…
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Tenet 2: The Test (1)
• The first complication comes from the way the 
device under test (DUT) is tested and the way 
data capture was performed.
• The general idea is to focus on prognostic testing 
– ensuring that your test design is inquisitive 
enough to capture all available information on an 
event and about relevant areas within the DUT.
– This runs counter to “testing your flight design” and is 
needed due to the nature of accelerated ground test 
environments.
• We will define design visibility as ensuring that 
the interface between what the DUT is doing and 
how the test system is operating is adequate to 
capture all relevant event information.
13
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Tenet 2: The Test (2)
• While this presentation isn’t a “how-to-test” document, it 
does recommend a thought process on what needs to be 
thoroughly considered in advance of test.
• An example would be: 
– A high-speed logic string, such as a shift register, with 
inadequate output buffer performance that limits operation to 
10% of the frequency capability.
• In a case like this, the choice of output buffer type along with a 
concept such as a windowed shift register (WSR) approach [Berg, 
et al] would allow for a proper operation and data capture.
– Of course, REAL logic rarely is just a string of shift registers 
and having appropriate designs within the FPGA that allow 
interpolation for applications is key (Berg, et al).
• Bottom line: know how the testing was done and the level 
of completeness and granularity of data captured.
14
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Tenet 3: The Analysis
• The real output of any SEE test campaign is not 
only the ability to determine rates for space 
usage, but also the error signatures of the events.
• This is the key to understanding the risk beyond 
the SEE rates and to provide the system 
designers the information to properly design 
mitigation or fault tolerance approaches.
• The simple way of viewing this is that all SEU 
events that cause SEFIs are not created equal:
– They have different circuit responses. Thus, capturing 
and diagnosing the events can be a challenge.
– One SEFI may change the operating mode, while 
another may cause a current increase.
15
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Diatribe 2: Limiting cross-sections (1)
• The theory is pretty straightforward: 
– Just because an event is not observed during a SEE test 
run doesn’t rule out the potential that the next particle 
will cause the event (or a different event).
• SEE is known to be a Markov process in that past 
performance is not necessarily an indicator what 
happens next.
– One then assumes that the next particle will cause an 
event.
– The limiting cross-section is usually designated as 
1/(fluence of the test run, i.e., the total number of 
particles/cm2 accumulated during that run).
16
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Diatribe 2: Limiting cross-sections (2)
• A simple example was documented in 1998 by LaBel, et al 
for a memory device.
– Proton SEE tests  were performed with a sample size of 3 and 
a proton test fluence of 1×1010 p/cm2
– A specific SEFI condition was not observed (row/column 
errors). However, it had been observed with heavy ions 
previously.
– The project utilizing this device did not understand that this 
implied a limiting cross-section, as opposed to a zero cross-
section or immunity to the effect.
– They flew 1000 samples of this device and observed this SEFI 
in flight.
– A re-test with 100 parts and a higher proton fluence confirmed 
this rare event and device sensitivity.
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In cases of billion transistor FPGAs, the probability of stimulating all 
possible error signatures is statistically zero for a typical test 
campaign. 
Thus, the best we can try to do is provide the limits for other error 
types not observed.
To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at the Field Programmable Gate Array Symposium, Chantilly, VA, August 23, 2016.
Caveat Emptor!
• The figure below is from the 1992 IEEE Radiation Effects Data 
Workshop (REDW) record (LaBel, et al.)
• To summarize what was presented,
– A system level test of an INTEL 80386 processor and several 
peripherals was performed at Brookhaven National Laboratories 
(BNL) Single Event Upset Test Facility (SEUTF).
– The data were for a representative test run and interpreted as 
“microlatchup” – a series of SEL events that caused a step-like 
increase with each event in the power supply current 
consumption.
– However, the device continued to function during the test run 
even with the increases.
18
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Mea Culpa!
• Realistically, more diagnostics were needed to 
determine if these really were SEL events and 
not possibly caused by SEU hits to hidden logic 
or bus contention or another SEFI event.
• Even over twenty years ago, device complexity 
and understanding should have been better 
explored. 
19
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Discussion
• The realistic implications are different depending on 
whether the device is commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) or 
custom-designed for radiation tolerance.
– For COTS, you will be dealing with unknowns and limitations, 
hence, capturing as many error signatures as possible 
provides the most useful information.
• It’s what the designers need to build appropriate mitigation into 
their systems.
– For custom design, you should be able to predict error 
signatures as long as there aren’t intellectual property (IP) 
blocks of unknown designs (black box).
• Thus, tests here are usually more about statistics to meet SEU 
rates or threshold levels.
• That is, unless unexpected SEFI events occur.
• Devices like FPGAs are afflicted with both implications:
– Custom designs are created, but there’s also manufacturer-embedded 
IP and hidden functions that require detailed error signature capture.
– Double the challenge!
20
To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at the Field Programmable Gate Array Symposium, Chantilly, VA, August 23, 2016.
Summary
• While far from a complete treatise on FPGA SEE 
testing, we have provided some caveats in 
reviewing a FPGA’s SEE performance based on 
collected data.
• The level of understanding of the device’s 
internal workings as well as the limitations of the 
test setup, allow proper risk-based analyses to be 
performed on the collected SEE data.
– It’s not just event rates, but event signatures and 
interpretation!
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